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Living with Leave Part II: Notice, Designation, and Substitution of Leave Issues
Note: We have developed our understanding of the assertions and concerns of various family and business groups from our reading of FMLA cases, from
materials developed by the groups, and through individual conversations with group representatives. Where comments have appeared in writing, we have
included at least one source for each concern or assertion, even if we have heard similar information from additional sources. For purposes of this chart, the term
“family and labor groups” includes: AFL-CIO, D.C. Employment Justice Center, Labor Project for Working Families, National Partnership for Women and
Families, and the National Women’s Law Center. For purposes of this chart, the term “business groups” includes: HR Policy Association (formerly LPA),
National Association of Manufacturers, Society for Human Resource Management, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

Issue

Family and labor
groups’ assertions and
concerns
(as we understand them)

Business groups’
assertions and concerns
(as we understand them)

An employer is required to
post a written notice regarding
an employee’s FMLA rights.

These requirements ensure that
workers have the timely
information they need to make
informed judgments about
when, whether, and how to
assert their rights under the
FMLA.

The only notice the statute
requires of employers is that they
post a notice about employees’
FMLA rights.

29 U.S.C. § 2619(a)
29 C.F.R. § 825.300

WF 2010 Comments

An employer is also required
to provide written notice
regarding the employees’
FMLA rights and obligations
in its employee handbook;
provide general written
guidance regarding
employees’ FMLA rights and
obligations if no such
handbook or manual exists;
and provide an individualized
notice to an employee of his or
her rights and responsibilities
under the law when the
employee requests leave.
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Issue

Family and labor
groups’ assertions and
concerns
(as we understand them)

Business groups’
assertions and concerns
(as we understand them)

These notice requirements
sufficiently protect employers
and give them a way to handle
their workforce issues.

Employees are required only to
provide oral notice, not written
notice. An employee is not
required to specifically mention
the FMLA; the employee need
only state that time off is needed
and provide a general reason that
might plausibly meet the FMLA
standard. The obligation then
shifts to the employer (often a
low level supervisor) to get the
necessary information to
determine whether the leave
qualifies under the FMLA. This
requires employers to pry
unnecessarily into an employee’s
private matters. (LPA)

WF 2010 Comments

29 C.F.R. § 825.301
See Sanders v. May Dept.
Stores Co., 315 F.3d 940 (8th
Cir. 2003); Conoshenti v.
Public Service Electric and
Gas Company, 364 F.3d 135
(3rd Cir. 2004).
An employee is required to
provide 30 days notice (or,
when the request is less than
30 days, “as practicable”)
when the need for leave is
foreseeable.
29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)
29 C.F.R. § 825.302(a)
The employee need not
mention the FMLA explicitly
when requesting leave. The
employee must provide “at
least verbal notice sufficient to
make the employer aware that
the employee needs FMLAqualifying leave.”

Many workers are not familiar
with or are confused about the
FMLA’s protections. (DOL
2000 study) It therefore makes
sense that employees not be
required to specifically request
FMLA leave or be required to
prove that their condition meets
the regulatory test for a serious
health condition.

29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c)
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“If a supervisor does not ask the
necessary probing questions and
improperly fails to classify the
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Issue

Family and labor
groups’ assertions and
concerns
(as we understand them)

See Brennerman v.
MedCentral Health System,
366 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2004);
Spangler v. Federal Home
Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278
F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2002);
Satterfield v. Wal-mart Stores,
Inc., 135 F.3d 973 (5th Cir.
1998); Manuel v. Westlake
Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758
(5th Cir. 1995).
An employer may require that
the employee submit a health
care provider’s certification of
the employee’s or family
member’s serious health
condition.

Business groups’
assertions and concerns
(as we understand them)
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leave as covered by the FMLA,
he or she could be personally
liable for the FMLA violation.”
(LPA)

It is sometimes difficult for
employees to get doctors’
appointments and/or get doctors
to complete and submit
paperwork in a timely fashion.

29 U.S.C. § 2613
29 C.F.R. § 825.305, 306, 307
See Perry v. Jaguar of Troy,
353 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2003);
Miller v. AT&T, 250 F.3d 820
(4th Cir. 2001); Henderson v.
Whirlpool Corp., 17 F.
Supp.2d 1238 (N.D. Okla.
1998).
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The regulations include an overly
expansive regulatory definition of
health care provider.
An employer is prohibited from
contacting the health care
provider without the employee’s
permission, even in order to
clarify or authenticate the
doctor’s certification. Even with
the employee’s permission, an
employer may not directly contact
the employee’s health care
provider. Rather, a health care
provider hired by the employer
must contact the employee’s
health care provider to get the
information. This is very
difficult, costly and time-

Regulations suggest that employers may delay or deny
FMLA leave if employee fails to provide timely
certification. Courts, however, generally have given
employees leeway in correcting untimely or
inadequate certifications.
The only time there appears to be an express
prohibition on contacting health care providers is after
the employee already has submitted a completed
medical certification. (See 29 C.F.R. § 825.307)
29 C.F.R. § 825.208 contemplates that a doctor will
talk directly to a supervisor and 29 C.F.R. §
825.302(c) has no express prohibition on a supervisor
calling a doctor with the employee’s consent.
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Issue

Family and labor
groups’ assertions and
concerns
(as we understand them)

Business groups’
assertions and concerns
(as we understand them)
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consuming for employers to
obtain clarification or
authentication of certifications.
(Chamber)
The employer has the right to
require an employee to get
second and third opinions.
These opinions must be paid
for by the employer.
29 U.S.C. § 2613(c), (d)
29 C.F.R. § 825.307
See Stekloff v. St. John’s
Mercy Health Systems, 218
F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2000); but
see, Miller v. AT&T, 60 F.
Supp. 2d 574 (S.D. W.Va.
1999); Sims v. AlamedaContra Costa Transit District,
2 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (N.D. Ca.
1998).
For pregnancy or chronic
conditions, employer may
request recertification no more
often than every 30 days
unless the circumstances
described in the previous

Regulation is insufficient –
allows the employer to deny
leave without seeking a second
or third opinion. Employers
who fail to exhaust the option
to seek second and third
opinions should be precluded
from challenging an
employee’s serious health
condition in subsequent
litigation. (AFL-CIO)

Getting second and third opinions
at the employer’s expense is
costly for employers.

These recertification rules are
reasonable and appropriate.
An employer should not be
permitted to harass employees
for recertifications. Moreover,
the employee bears the cost of

These recertification rules do not
allow employers sufficient
management control. Once an
employee gets a “note from the
doctor” stating the need for
intermittent leave because of
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Employer may request recertification in less than 30
days if “the employer receives information that casts
doubt upon the continuing validity of the
certification” (per 29 C.F.R. § 825.308).
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Issue

Family and labor
groups’ assertions and
concerns
(as we understand them)

Business groups’
assertions and concerns
(as we understand them)

certification have changed
dramatically or the employer
receives information that casts
doubt on the employee’s stated
reason for absence.

the recertification.

some medical condition, that
employee can continue to use that
certification. An employer may
not require the employee to
provide a certification for each
absence.

Certifications for intermittent
or reduced schedule leave
should include the minimum
period necessary for such
leave. Employers may not
require recertification in less
than this minimum period,
unless one of the
circumstances noted above
applies.

WF 2010 Comments

The fact that an employer may
not request a second or third
opinion on recertification is very
problematic. It means that
employers have no real recourse
for challenging the validity of
recertification even when the
employer suspects abuse. (NAM)

Recertifications are at the
employee’s expense.
Employers may not require
second and third opinions at
the recertification stage.
29 U.S.C. § 2613(e)
29 C.F.R. § 825.308

An employer is required to
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Issue

Family and labor
groups’ assertions and
concerns
(as we understand them)

Business groups’
assertions and concerns
(as we understand them)
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Putting this burden on the
employer is appropriate. This
protects employees who are
unsure about whether their
leave is FMLA qualifying (i.e.,
whether, if they choose to take
leave, it will be job-protected).
It also gives the employees the
information they need to decide

The burden on the employer is
unrealistic. Once a request for
leave has been made, an employer
has only two days to determine
whether the leave is FMLA
qualifying and then to notify the
employee. This is difficult to
administer, particularly when HR
departments are in different

Query: How do the designation and certification
requirements work together in practice? If employer
has to designate leave as FMLA leave within 2 days,
but employer also has the right to seek certification of
the request, does the preliminary designation process
set forth in the regulations (29 C.F.R. § 825.208(e)(2))
work well for employers?

advise an employee who
requests FMLA leave whether
s/he is eligible (e.g., meets the
1250 hours and one year
threshold).
29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d)
See Babcock v. Bellsouth
Advertising and Publishing
Corp., 348 F.3d 73 (4th Cir.
2003); Duty v. Norton-Alcoa
Proppants, 293 F.3d 481 (8th
Cir. 2002); Kosakow v. New
Rochelle Radiology
Associates, P.C., 274 F.3d 706
(2nd Cir. 2001); Gurley v.
Ameriwood Indus., 232 F.
Supp. 2d 969 (E.D. Mo. 2002).

An employer is required to
designate leave as FMLA
leave. An employer is also
required to notify the
employee if paid leave will be
substituted for the FMLA
leave (and designated as
FMLA leave). As a general
matter, this designation and
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Family and labor
groups’ assertions and
concerns
(as we understand them)

Business groups’
assertions and concerns
(as we understand them)

notice must occur within two
days of the leave being
requested.

how to use their leave.

locations than the employee’s
worksite.

29 C.F.R. § 825.208
See Conoshenti v. Public
Service Elec. & Gas Co., 364
F.3d 135 (3rd Cir. 2004);
Katekovich v. Team Rent a
Car of Pittsburgh,
2002 WL 1288766 (3rd Cir.
2002); Hicks v. Leroy’s
Jewelers, Inc., 225 F.3d 659
(6th Cir. 2000); Phillips v.
Leroy-Somer North America,
et al., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5334 (W.D. Tenn. 2003);
Blankenship v. Buchanan
General Hospital, Inc., 999 F.
Supp. 832 (W.D.Va 1998).

Allowing employers to require
substitution of paid leave (to
run concurrently with the
FMLA leave) benefits
employers. It ensures that an
employee’s overall leave will
not exceed 12 weeks. (National
Partnership)
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Employers are not sure who is
really entitled to FMLA leave; it
is difficult to make a quick
determination. (See discussion in
Chart I re definition of serious
health condition; see also
discussion above re the fact that
employees need not expressly
request FMLA leave.)
Apparently the change/fix in the
Gregg bill (re substitution of paid
leave) is not something all
business groups are asking for:
“Employers generally support the
existing provisions of the FMLA
that authorize them to run FMLA
leave concurrently with existing
employer-provided paid leave
benefits. While there was some
discussion that the provisions of
[the Gregg bill] addressing paid
leave substitution might help with
those employees trying to game
the system, most LPA members
did not see this provision as
offering substantial help or
clarification to them.” (LPA)
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Family and labor
groups’ assertions and
concerns
(as we understand them)

Business groups’
assertions and concerns
(as we understand them)
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Impact of Ragsdale v.
Wolverine World Wide, Inc.,
535 U.S. 81 (2002).

Ragsdale struck down 29
C.F.R. § 825.700(a) because
the penalty was not tailored to
the harm suffered by the
particular employee. The
holding in that case is strictly
limited to 29 C.F.R. §
825.700(a) and to the facts of
that case.

DOL’s notice provisions are no
longer valid. (NAM)

The lower courts appear to be applying Ragsdale to
invalidate the penalty provisions of the notice or
designation requirements (i.e., leave taken is not
counted as FMLA leave) only when individual harm
cannot be proven.

Thus, the general regulatory
designation and notice
requirements are still valid.
DOL has the authority to issue
an enforcement provision that
would make it possible for an
employee to prove that a failure
to designate and/or notify
constitutes “actual harm.”
(National Partnership)

Long term impact of Ragsdale is unknown.
Could be interpreted by the lower courts to mean:
Only the penalty provision at issue in Ragsdale (29
C.F.R. §825.700(a)) is invalid, but it is invalid only
when individual harm can’t be shown;
-OROnly the penalty provision at issue in Ragsdale (29
C.F.R. §825.700(a)) is invalid, but it is invalid in all
cases;
-ORAll penalties imposed by the regulations that create a
substantive right to leave beyond that found in the
statute are invalid.
In addition, as noted above, some business groups
also believe all of the notice requirements in the
regulations exceed DOL’s authority under the statute.
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